What Is a Corporation?
Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise
Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood)
Teemu Ruskola
[I]t is a serious oversimplification to categorize modern Western legal systems as ideological reflections of capitalism. Much modern
law is more feudal in character than capitalist. Much defies any
characterization in socioeconomic terms. A more complex system
of categorization and characterization is needed, which will draw
not only on types of economic and political formation but also on
philosophical, religious, and other kinds of criteria.1
– Harold J. Berman
Contract, that greediest of legal categories, which once wanted to
devour the state, resents being told that it cannot painlessly digest
even a joint-stock company.2
– Frederick W. Maitland
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I. INTRODUCTION
What is a corporation? An easy, but not very informative, answer is
that it is a person—a legal person, that is. More substantive answers suggest that it is a moral person, a person/thing, a production team, a nexus
of private agreements, a city, a semi-sovereign, a (secular) God, or a
penguin (kind of).3 Surprisingly, despite the economic, political, and social importance of the corporate form, we do not have a generally accepted legal theory of what a corporation is, apart from the law’s questionable assertion that it is a “person.” Insofar as legal scholars theorize
corporation law, they draw predominantly on economic theories of “the
firm”—economists’ umbrella term for business enterprise.4
In this speculative essay, I hope to place the idea, and law, of the
corporation in a comparative context and to suggest, following the English legal historian Frederic Maitland, that corporation law is a “theme
from the borderland where ethical speculation marches with jurisprudence.”5 I do so not to question the utility of economic theories of the
corporation as such but to suggest that by thinking in terms of broader
concepts—such as organization of economic enterprise more generally—
and by considering those concepts in the context of the larger political

3. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 3629 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (1999); Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations As Cities: Targeting the
Nodes in Overlapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. L. 533 (2004); Peter A. French, The Corporation As a
Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979); Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things, and Corporations: The
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L.
583 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 3056
(1976); Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation As God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501 (2005); Daniel Greenwood,
The Semi-Sovereign Corporation (Utah Legal Studies Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=757315.
4. In his recent critique of economic theories of the firm Eric Orts insists that such theories are
inadequate insofar as they fail to take account of legal institutions. His own analysis, demonstrating
law’s critical role in the organization of corporations, is best regarded as an interdisciplinary account, rather than a solely legal one (which is a strength, not a weakness, of Orts’s method). See
ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013). While economic theories of the firm dominate the analysis of corporation law, I do not wish to suggest that they occupy
the entire field. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUSTICE 181 (2005); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence” of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988); James Boyd White, How Should We
Talk About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416
(1985).
5. 3 FREDERIC MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in THE COLLECTED
PAPERS 304, 304 (H.A.L. Fisher ed. 1911).
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economy in which economic enterprise is necessarily embedded, we will
be able to see better the utility and limits of any particular theory.6
Below, I outline theories of enterprise organization in three idealtypical worlds that I call liberal, Confucian, and socialist. My template
for liberalism in this sense is the United States while the main source of
my idealized notions of Confucian and socialist polities are late imperial
China and the People’s Republic of China before the inception of economic reforms in 1978, respectively. Exemplifying distinctive political
and moral economies, they help us see more clearly some of the assumptions we make about (U.S.) corporation law. At the outset, I want to state
that my aim here is not to advocate or defend any one of the three theories I outline below. To the contrary, I argue that each of them has distinctive conceptual difficulties in justifying the organization of economic
enterprise in the form of corporate entities.7 None of the theories is selfevidently superior to the others. Collectively, they offer a range of different possibilities with distinctive social, political, and moral visions.
Rather, what a comparative analysis of different theories of enterprise
organization can do is to bring to focus the cultural specificity of each.
What economists ordinarily call the theory of the firm is in fact best
thought as a liberal theory of the firm, which assumes in turn a particular
division of labor among the institutions of the market, the state, and the
family. Stated in the parlance of economics, not only institutions of the
material kind but even our theories about them can become pathdependent, losing sight of the historical contingency of the phenomena
they seek to analyze.
In Part II, I briefly sketch the broad ideological contours of liberalism, Confucianism, and Chinese state socialism, while Part III examines
the theoretical status and place of economic enterprise in each. Part IV
analyzes some of the ways in which all three theories of enterprise organization resort to distinctive ideological fictions to maintain their internal
coherence: fabrications of corporate personhood, invented kinship, and
6. I am by no means the only scholar to argue for broader theoretical frameworks. See, e.g.,
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PREINDUSTRIAL STUDIES (1983). For a
broadly functionalist approach in an expressly comparative frame, see REINER H. KRAAKMAN ET
AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reiner
H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
7. I use a minimalist definition of the corporation, borrowing from SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY
AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT (Beard Books
2000) (1939). For Livermore, an enterprise takes on “corporate” characteristics insofar as it institutes
a division of labor among individuals who participate in it solely as investors, on the one hand, and
persons who manage its operation, on the other—that is, a separation between ownership and management, which typically occurs as the size and complexity of an enterprise increase.
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aspirational unity in a socialist ideal of “the people,” respectively. Part V
considers the practical implications of the preceding analysis in the context of the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Part VI concludes.
II. IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL ECONOMIES
What are some key assumptions about the relationship among the
state, the market, and the family that inform U.S.-style liberal capitalism,
political theories of Chinese Confucianism, and pre-1978 Chinese state
socialism? Needless to say, there are many kinds of liberalism, Confucianism, and socialism. What I try to do below is to set out key terms of
one particular type of liberalism (U.S. liberal capitalism), one type of
Confucianism (ideology of the late imperial Chinese state), and one type
of socialism (state socialism of the PRC before the current era of economic reforms). I have chosen them, not because they are especially
worthy examples of the ideologies they represent, but because they
represent historically significant instances of each.
It is also important to note that insofar as the accounts below pertain to ideologies, they must not be confused with descriptions of how
any of the societies to which they refer have been organized in fact. 8
Moreover, as ideal-typical constructions, they are not fully accurate historical descriptions even of the ideologies of their respective societies.
Rather, they focus on certain salient aspects of each for the purpose of
facilitating a comparative analysis.
A. Liberalism: State, Market, and Family
It is a key premise of the modern liberal state that the appropriate
means of regulating a social interaction depends on the nature of the interaction to be regulated.9 As that state is imagined in the United States,
all of social life is divisible into autonomous spheres that operate, or
ought to operate, relatively independently of each other with a unique
rationality—a governing logic—that is proper to it. At the highest level
of generalization, there are three distinct spheres: the political sphere of
the state, the economic sphere of the market, and a residual sphere of
relations of interpersonal intimacy. 10 Tellingly, this last sphere is the
8. My definition of ideology is Althusserian, as that which “represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER ESSAYS 162 (1971).
9. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983).
10. One major aspect of modern life that seems to be missing altogether in this schema is culture. Insofar as the term refers to artifacts of high culture, we might locate it in the intimate sphere,
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least well-defined, and even the political and economic vocabulary for
describing it is not as developed as it is for the other two spheres.
Although it includes a broad range of associations with intimates, with
kith and kin, for present purposes I will call it the sphere of the family for
short.11
Each of these spheres in turn has a unique governing logic that is
proper to it. The political sphere of the state is organized predominantly
as a structure of authority. Backed by its monopoly on legitimate violence, the state is empowered to extract resources from society and redistribute them on the basis of politically made determinations. It has the
power to order an unwilling tax-payer to pay his due, displace a person
from her home by the power of eminent domain, and even take a person’s freedom or life. In the economic sphere of the market, in contrast,
the allocation of resources among private actors takes place on the basis
of consensual exchange. The principal governing logic of the market is
contract. Ideally, the sphere of the family should be regulated only minimally, in order not to disturb the relations of intimacy that undergird it.
When economic transfers take place among loved ones (say, unpaid domestic household labor performed by a stay-at-home spouse), such transactions are ideally at least attributed to altruistic motives (labor in return
for love). We might thus say that the intimate sphere relies on the logic
of sharing and interpersonal trust, rather than self-interested exchange.
The three principal logics of authority, contract, and trust ought to
operate independently of one another. For instance, the exercise of authority has its necessary and proper place in the political sphere of the
as the privileged locus for emotional experience and the production of subjective meaning. With
respect to commercialized forms of mass culture, we might locate it in the nexus of the market and
the intimate sphere, as both a commodity (in the market) and a form of leisure (in the intimate
sphere). However, we might also say that it is in fact culture in the broadest sense that determines the
boundaries among the different spheres: the logics that operate within each sphere are ultimately
cultural logics.
Similarly, one might ask where civil society fits in this picture. If we define the term so broadly
that it refers to non-state institutions generally, it would exist both in the sphere of the market and
the intimate sphere. It is noteworthy, however, that the term “civil society” itself is less well defined
than “the state” or “the economy,” and the fact that we have some difficulty determining its precise
locus in this (admittedly simplistic) liberal schema probably tells us something about the ambiguous
status of civil society itself, at least in classical liberalism.
The schema’s historicity is even more evident if we consider the changing place of religion.
Once upon a time, it would surely have been a major socio-political field in its own right, but today
we regard religion as mostly a private matter that belongs in the residual sphere of intimate experience.
11. I provide a slightly longer sketch of this tripartite schema and of the outlines of its historical development in Teemu Ruskola, Home Economics: What Is the Difference Between a Family
and a Corporation?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 324, 335–37 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C.
Williams eds., 2005).
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state, yet direct governmental authority becomes suspect when applied to
the market, and even more so when the object of regulation is familial or
other intimate relationships, except insofar as regulation is vital for policing the boundaries among the different spheres and for preserving the
integrity of the system as a whole. Likewise, the economic logic of the
marketplace is inappropriate both in the political and intimate spheres:
neither votes nor babies should be sold. Finally, the logic of the intimate
sphere, or more precisely the lack of a rational logic, and reliance on love
and trust is also best kept where it belongs—in the family and among
friends. One trusts a politician at one’s own risk, and in the marketplace
too bargains are ordinarily struck at arm’s length.
The above schema can be summarized as follows:

INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
GOVERNING
LOGIC

POLITICAL
SPHERE

ECONOMIC
SPHERE

INTIMATE
SPHERE

State

Market

Family

Authority

Contract

Trust

It is important to reiterate that this chart outlines an ideological vision. No state can rely on the basis of brute force alone, markets cannot
function in the complete absence of trust, and families too can be battlefields of economic as well as physical domination rather than havens of
love and trust. I offer this schema not to describe liberal capitalism as it
works in practice in the United States (or anywhere on Earth) but to capture an important set of liberal intuitions that most of us share, at least to
some extent.
What is the status of economic enterprise in this picture?
Remarkably, although corporate forms of enterprise are the predominant
economic actor in liberal capitalist societies as they currently exist, they
have an uneasy existence in liberal economic, political, and legal theory.
The paradigmatic subject in the political and economic spheres is the
individual. Even as the state stands in a relationship of authority over us,
we retain certain rights against it as individuals. Likewise, in the marketplace we enter into contracts as individuals. The family, in contrast, is
the one place where we are expected to shed our self-interested individual motivations to come together with others. The corporation has no natural resting place in this order. On the one hand, as an economic entity it
would seem to be the quintessential actor in the market. On the other
hand, the corporation is also evidently a collective entity while the marketplace is paradigmatically an arena of interaction among self-interested
individuals.
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Indeed, the corporation has been a problem for legal theorists in
considerable part because we live in a legal system that thinks in terms of
“persons.” It has been a jurisprudential conundrum for U.S. law to justify
the existence of collective entities such as corporations in terms that accord with liberal individualism. If all legal rights and duties must be held
by a person, then every legal actor must be one, no matter the conceptual
violence this may entail. It is this logic that gives birth to the legal fiction
of the corporation as a person in its own right, as if it were a human being.
This is a solution that only a lawyer (or a poet) could find satisfactory. It is hardly theoretically adequate. Historically, there has been endless metaphysical speculation about whether corporations are “real” persons or not.12 Today, there are a number of economic theories to explain
why, even in the presumptively individualistic sphere of the market,
there are in fact collective entities such as corporations. I will consider
those analyses and their adequacy in Part III. First, however, let us compare some of the key ideological premises of liberalism with those of
Confucianism and socialism.
B. Confucianism: Kinship All the Way down, and Up
The term “Confucianism” has been used to refer to as wide a range
of ideas and institutions as “liberalism.” Here I use it to refer to the general features of the ideology of the late-imperial Chinese state as perpetuated by the civil service examination system.13 This orthodox form of
Confucianism was more rigid than the philosophical forms of Confucianism from which it originated. At the same time, the state’s ideological
pronouncements must not be mistaken for the actual policies of Confucian officialdom. What follows is emphatically not a description of Chinese society as it ever existed; rather, it is a sketch of a historically dominant state ideology.
Perhaps the most significant difference between liberal and Confucian worldviews (in the specific senses defined here) is that while the
former seeks to divide social life into separate spheres, the aspirational
norm of Confucianism is unity. All aspects of social life are to be regulated by the fiduciary logic of Confucian kinship relations. That is, all of
social life ought to constitute one harmonious whole governed by a system of patriarchal norms where junior kin owe duties of obedience to
12. See, e.g., Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
643 (1932).
13. See generally ICHISADA MIYAZAKI, CHINA’S EXAMINATION HELL: THE CIVIL SERVICE
EXAMINATIONS OF IMPERIAL CHINA (Conrad Schirokauer trans., Yale Univ. Press 1981) (1976).
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those above while the senior kin in turn owe reciprocal duties of care to
those below.
Reflecting this outlook, not only were Chinese county magistrates
traditionally referred to as “father-and-mother officials” (fu-mu guan)14
but the entire state was conceptualized as a family writ large with the
emperor as a kind of pater-familias.15 It was precisely for this reason that
unfilial behavior in the family was subject to punishment by the state:
defiance of paternal authority necessarily implied the possibility of defiance of state authority, as the two were ultimately expressions of a single
principle. Ideally, even economic production was organized in ways that
respected the fiduciary norms of Confucian kinship relations as closely
as possible, namely in families.16
If we were to superimpose the Confucian normative vision on the
chart summarizing liberalism, it would look something like this:
POLITICAL
SPHERE
INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
GOVERNING
LOGIC

ECONOMIC
SPHERE

INTIMATE
SPHERE

Family
Trust

In brief, the fiduciary structures of Confucian kinship should inform the
operation of the political and economic spheres as well as the intimate
one of familial relations in a nested hierarchy of isomorphic institutions.
Ideally, it is kinship all the way down, and up.17

14. T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH’ING 14 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1962).
15. In one classical formulation, “The son of Heaven is the parent of the people, and so becomes the parent of the Empire.” The Shoo King, in 3 THE CHINESE CLASSICS 333 (J. Legge ed. &
trans., reprt ed. 1939) (1865). Although Confucius himself did not make the express parent–ruler
analogy, his follower Mencius did, and it was indeed the Mencian interpretation that became the
foundation for the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. See MENCIUS 1.A.4, 3.A.3 (D.C. Lau trans., Penguin
Books 1970).
16. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000); see also
DAVID FAURE, CHINA AND CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF BUSINESS ENTEPRISE IN MODERN CHINA
31–42 (2006); MADELINE ZELIN, THE MERCHANTS OF ZIGONG: INDUSTRIAL ENTRE-PRENEURSHIP
IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 113–14 (2005).
17. Indeed, as I have observed elsewhere, kinship relations represented the ideal model even
for intercourse among states. See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND MODERN LAW 106–07 (2013); Teemu Ruskola, Raping Like a State, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1477, 1486–87 (2000).
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We have already noted liberal theory’s difficulties in accounting for
the existence of corporate forms of enterprise. Their collective nature is
not a problem for Confucianism: it is axiomatic that collectives are morally prior to individuals. The Chinese legal tradition has thus had no need
to resort to jurisprudential fictions of personhood to justify the existence
of entities that are composed of groups of human beings. To be human is
to exist in fiduciary communities with others. Rather, to act alone in the
selfish pursuit of pecuniary gain—to act like a homo economicus—is to
make oneself less than human, or at least to become a “small person”
(xiao ren).18 In the politico-moral ontology of Confucian thought, it is the
kinship group—the family—that is the “natural person,” whereas a selfseeking individual is an unnatural deviation from the norms of kinship. 19
While Confucianism as the dominant ideology of the Chinese imperial state had no trouble accommodating production in collective kinship
units, it created genuine ideological problems for non-kinship entities
engaged in the operation of economic enterprise, as Part III elaborates.
C. Socialism: The People’s Republic of Everything
If both liberalism and Confucianism have had distinctive ideological problems in conceptualizing economic enterprise because of the nature of the primary legal and moral subjects they assume (and as Part III
elaborates), are the general premises of socialist political and legal theory
more accommodating? If liberalism’s problem is its prioritization of the
individual over the collective, both Confucianism and socialism regard
the collective as ontologically prior to the individual. Of course, the collective subjects of the two ideologies are very different. In the Confucian
political order, the sole metaphysically “real” subject is the kinship
group, whereas in socialism that place is occupied by “the people.”
If we transpose the ideological vision of socialism on the liberal
state–market–family schema, what do the institutions of socialism look

18. On xiao ren, see, e.g., A.C. GRAHAM, DISPUTERS OF THE TAO: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT
(1989).
19. It is important to emphasize that while I use the single term “family” to characterize kinship institutions under U.S. style liberalism, Chinese late imperial Confucianism, and state socialism
in the PRC, I do not mean to suggest that “family” has a transhistorical meaning. Describing the
Confucian worldview in terms of a liberal state-market-family schema by definition entails the imposition of a set of foreign categories on it. I use the term “family” simply to refer to a set of institutions in Confucianism that occupy a social space roughly similar to what would be identified as
belonging to “family” in liberalism. The very fact that Confucian thought defines family as a universal principle of social organization, rather than one that stands in opposition to the market and the
state, necessarily marks the notion as fundamentally different. The same caveat applies mutatis mutandis to use my use of the terms “state” and “market” in this essay.
IN ANCIENT CHINA 19–20
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like? In Friedrich Engels’s memorable words, once people organize relations of production on the basis of freedom and equality, the state will
wither away and end up where it belongs, “in the museum of antiquities,
next to the spinning wheel and the bronze ax.”20 Needless to say, the political and economic institutions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
do not represent those of full-blown utopian communism, but rather the
apparent perversion of socialism that in the twentieth century came to be
known as “state socialism.” This hybrid political formation is justified by
the theory that until the final and complete realization of communism,
the state constitutes a temporary placeholder for the interests of the people.
Nevertheless, “the people” rarely act as a singular subject, beyond
revolutionary acts of violence, which by definition cannot take the place
of ordinary political action. In the modern centralized state where direct
democracy on the Athenian model is simply not possible, popular representation necessarily takes institutionalized forms. In the PRC, as in the
former Soviet Union, the primary vehicle for popular representation is
not electoral democracy but the leadership of the Communist Party. The
Party is in fact the sole legitimate entity below the level of the state—or
parallel to it—that is not simply an extension of it. It justifies itself on
Leninist grounds by purporting to represent “the vanguard of the people.” While the Party is a subset of the people, it is one that professes to
understand the people’s interests better than the people themselves do. It
therefore exercises legitimate authority to advance those interests. This is
the justification for the institution of “democratic dictatorship of the people,” exemplified by the Party-state.21
Although Confucianism and socialism could hardly be further apart
in terms of their ideological justifications for the use of authority—
enforcing hierarchical kinship norms versus advancing “the people’s”
interests—as ideal-typical orders both insist on a single logic that ought
to organize all spheres of social life. For it is not only in the political
sphere that the Party-state exercises direct authority in the name of the
people. It does so in the economy as well, making allocative decisions on
the people’s behalf on the basis of a central plan. 22
Marx was as unenthusiastic about the bourgeois institution of the
family as he was about the state. He called for its abolition as a patriar20. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 232
(Eleanor Burke Leacock ed. & trans., Int’l Press 1972) (1884).
21. See generally MAO TSE-TUNG, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED
WORKS 411 (Foreign Language Press 1975) (1960).
22. See generally DOROTHY SOLINGER, CHINESE BUSINESS UNDER SOCIALISM (1984).
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chal institution of “latent slavery” and a vehicle for the intergenerational
transmission of wealth. 23 From a psychological perspective, it constitutes
an arena of particularistic attachments that divert from the promotion of
the well-being of all the people. Even Mao Zedong was not able to abolish the family, yet during the Cultural Revolution he wished to redistribute his comrades’ affective investments from family to politics, effectively urging them to love the people (or the Chairman himself) more than
their kinfolk. Indeed, to this day even family planning is seen as an aspect of state planning in the PRC, not something that can or should be
left to families themselves. 24
This ideological vision of all of social life organized in accordance
with a single state-based logic, derived from the state’s status as a representative of the people, can thus be summarized as follows:
POLITICAL
SPHERE
INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
GOVERNING
LOGIC

ECONOMIC
SPHERE

INTIMATE
SPHERE

State
Authority

Is there a place for a “theory of the firm” in this worldview? As in the
case of Confucianism and unlike in liberalism, the fact that economic
enterprise is a collective undertaking is not in itself a problem. In fact,
from its founding the PRC has devoted enormous amounts of resources
to setting up large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of various kinds. What
is a problem is determining the boundary between the state and the enterprise, as Part III explains.
III. THREE THEORIES OF ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION
Having sketched the general contours of U.S.-style liberalism, Chinese Confucianism, and Chinese state socialism in their ideal-typical
forms, it is time to examine more closely how each of them justifies their
preferred forms of enterprise organization. A lion’s share of the analysis
that follows is taken up by liberalism (section A), while socialism occupies the least space (section C). The very idea of a theory of enterprise
organization is one that grows out of the context of liberal capitalism.
Consequently there exists a large literature on the topic, which I canvass
23. KARL MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 52 (Prometheus Books 1998); see also ENGELS,
supra note 20.
24. See Population and Family Planning Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002) (China).
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at some length below. State socialism too has its own analysis of enterprise organization: it simply does not recognize the political legitimacy
of business enterprises independent of the state. This theoretical position
is easy to set out without much elaboration. As to late imperial Confucianism (section B), it never had a cadre of economists devoted to analyzing business enterprise in theoretical terms. However, drawing on an
analysis that I have developed at greater length elsewhere, I argue that
Confucianism did in fact have what we might call a “functional” theory
of the firm, with the kinship group providing the paradigm for the organization of enterprise.
A. Liberalism: Economic Theories of the Firm
That law calls corporations “persons” does not make it so. The state
and the individual are the unchallenged protagonists of the modern legal
universe—we take their existence as givens. Economic entities such as
corporations, in contrast, occupy the murky intermediate space between
the state and the individual. As Hobbes starkly put it, the existence of
corporations within the state is like having “wormes in the entrayles of a
naturall man.”25 The two “easy” ways to accommodate their existence is
to assimilate them to the state, the solution preferred by socialism, or to
reduce them to groupings of individuals, which affirms the premise of
liberal individualism. (The distinctive Confucian solution is analyzed in
section B below.)
Let us turn to the liberal solution first. As we already noted, it is
significant that we do not have a “legal” theory of the corporation as
such—apart from the profound but ultimately uninstructive assertion that
corporations are persons at law. Theories that dominate legal scholarship
are pre-eminently economic theories rather than legal ones. I will briefly
consider two of them: neoclassical and institutionalist theories.
The neoclassical theory of the corporation takes the premise of
methodological individualism to its logical conclusion, insisting that the
term “corporation” is only shorthand for a “nexus of contracts” among
numerous individual participants in a joint venture. 26 There is effectively
no “there” there. Corporation law is only a set of gap fillers: default contract terms that govern when individuals fail to negotiate complete
agreements as they undertake collective economic undertakings. This is a
parsimonious, perhaps even elegant, solution. Significantly, however, it

25. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 375 (Penguin 1968) (1651) (original spelling).
26. The locus classicus of the modern neoclassical theory of the firm is Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 3.
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has difficulty accounting for various aspects of corporation law that are
in fact mandatory and not subject to individual contracting in the first
place. The theory rationalizes such mandatory rules of corporation law as
representing the “hypothetical contracts” that the parties would enter into, if only they had the opportunity and all the requisite information to do
so.27
In contrast, institutional economists seek to analyze firms as they
exist in fact—as institutions for coordinating collective economic activity—rather than networks of discrete contracts. Institutionalists resort neither to legal fictions nor to hypothetical contracts in considering circumstances where asymmetries of information or otherwise high transaction
costs make ex ante agreements costly or impossible. In the institutionalist
view, there are two primary solutions to this problem: organizing relations of production in terms of trust or authority, rather than contract.28
Trust is the simpler and least costly solution. People who trust each
other need not expend time and energy negotiating complex contracts
and monitoring each other’s performance. Alas, while trust is the most
efficient solution to the existence of high transaction costs of contracting,
it is also the most fragile and elusive. Finding people whom one in fact
can trust is not easy, and those people tend to be limited to family and
close friends. Although institutionalists recognize the existence, and importance, of trust, they often have difficulty in accounting for it when it
does exist. Oliver Williamson argues that people trust each other because
it “pays off.”29 Nevertheless, the kind of “calculative trust” that Williamson posits is rather counterintuitive and even the opposite of trust in the
ordinary sense of the term.
Employing paid workers represents a solution that is based on authority. When an entrepreneur cannot predict beforehand precisely what
she will need and when, she is not in a position to enter into multiple
contracts with outside providers for all the inputs she needs. Just as not
everyone can be trusted, nor can everything be outsourced. In those situations an entrepreneur will hire employees to work directly under managerial supervision, with the understanding that during that time she has
the power—within limits set by employment law—to control her em27. The formulation here follows generally what is the most extensive use of neoclassical
economic theory in the analysis of corporation law by FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996).
28. There are many strands of institutionalist analyses of the firm. In general terms, they all
draw on Ronald Coase’s seminal The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
29. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 466 (1993).

652

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:639

ployees directly. Kenneth Arrow describes the employment contract as
an employee’s sale of her “willingness to obey authority” so that “what
is being bought and sold is not a definite objective thing but rather a personal relation.”30 In this regard, the employment contract is evidently not
just another market transaction among others, but a qualitatively distinct
one: a structure of authority. To institutional economists, corporations
and other similar business organizations are thus emphatically not mere
nexuses of contracts in the even wider web of contracts that is the marketplace as a whole. Instead, they are islands of vertically structured hierarchy in an otherwise horizontally organized marketplace. Rather than
extensions of markets, they are, in an important sense, their very antithesis.31
In light of the above analysis of the political economy of the liberal
state, it is noteworthy that using trust and authority to explain the organization of production amounts in effect to borrowing the logic of the two
primary non-economic social fields: that of the family, in the case of
trust, and of the state, in the case of authority. To be sure (and putting
trust aside for a moment), when institutional economists distinguish between horizontally structured markets and vertically organized hierarchies, what they have in mind are economic hierarchies, not political
ones. Nevertheless, as a structure of authority a firm does rely on what is
paradigmatically the logic of the state—the power to command—to explain the organization of production. As a kind of mini-state, a corporation is effectively a small-scale command economy where factors of production are allocated by decree.32
It bears noting that the institutional structures themselves by which
modern business corporations exercise their authority are also state-like.
One of the key attributes of the modern centralized state is not only its
monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence but also the formal rationalization of its structures of authority. 33 The simultaneous centralization and rationalization of authority is similarly a distinguishing feature
of the modern managerial corporation, also administered through a bureaucracy, albeit a private one. Again, while neoclassical theory effectively reduces a corporation to a set of contracts, institutional economists
borrow the political logic of the state to explain—rather than simply ex30. KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 25, 64 (1974) (emphasis added).
31 . See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1983).
32 . See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
33. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ch. XI (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968).
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plain away—the modern corporation as an institutionalized structure of
authority.
Moreover, the business corporation is a hybrid institution embodying not only the economic logic of contract and the political one of authority but also elements of the fiduciary logic of the family. Consider
the so-called “agency problem” of corporation law. In principle, shareholders occupy the position of principals in a corporation while managers
are their agents, charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in
the principals’ interest, rather than their own. The agency problem is the
following: given the separation of ownership and management in the
modern business corporation, how can shareholders monitor managers
effectively?34
In fact, the very term “agency problem” is a legal misnomer, appropriated from economic discourse. In a legal sense, shareholders are not
managers’ principals, for they fail to meet the core part of the definition
of legal agency: principal’s control over agent. Indeed, the agency problem arises precisely because of shareholders’ lack of control over managers. 35 In contrast, the manager–employee relationship is a principal–
agent one (since managers have direct authority over employees), whereas shareholders cannot simply command managers to manage as they
wish. Rather, their recourse is to vote the managers out, while the right to
operate the corporation on a day-to-day basis lies with the managers
themselves.
Nevertheless, it would be utterly naïve to ask shareholders to simply trust managers. In other words, as far as the shareholder–manager relationship is concerned, none of the three main operational logics of the
liberal state seem adequate: contract (the market logic) fails, as do authority (the political logic) and trust (the logic of the intimate sphere).
Corporation law has stepped into this vacuum by establishing a fiduciary
duty for managers to seek to realize the interests of the corporation as a
whole. This legal duty can be viewed as an attempt to institute, or at least
legally mimic, a relationship of trust where none exists in sociological or
psychological terms. It is, in an important sense, an effort to transplant
the operational logic of the intimate sphere into the corporation.
Viewed from a macro perspective, what we witness in the corporation is thus a confluence of all three main types of logics of liberalism,
34. The classic statement of the agency problem is ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
35. This often-overlooked point is emphatically noted in LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC (2012); see also ORTS, supra note 4, at 60.
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meeting in various guises in a single locus, rather than remaining in separate spheres.
B. Confucianism: Kinship Theories of the Firm
Having analyzed some of the problems of liberal political theory
and American corporate jurisprudence, let us turn to the status of business enterprise in Confucian political theory. In contrast to liberal theory,
the collective nature of corporate entities is not a problem, as I have already noted: it is a Confucian axiom that the collective is morally prior to
the individual. Instead, historically the main ideological problem for
Chinese business enterprise has been the officially anti-mercantile attitude of Confucianism and its theoretical (although typically not actual)
hostility to profit seeking. Starting from the moral premise that the only
legitimate collective is the kinship group and that one is not supposed to
take advantage of one’s kin, historically Chinese corporate entities have
spent much of their energy justifying to the state (and themselves) a type
of entity that is in fact engaged in profit-seeking at others’ expense.
Because of this ideological kinship-orientation, there is a longstanding scholarly tradition going back at least to Max Weber that maintains that an important reason why capitalism did not develop indigenously in China was the absence of the corporation in the sense of the
Western legal tradition.36 That is, in the absence of the legal fiction of the
corporation as a person in its own right, by default most Chinese businesses were merely family businesses, necessarily limited in scope and
rarely surviving for more than a few generations. As I have elaborated at
greater length elsewhere, in numerous Chinese “family” businesses the
notion of kinship was in fact little more than a fiction serving to justify
the existence of what I have called “clan corporations”—much as the
personhood of the U.S. business corporation is a legal fiction. In a Confucian polity, an entity that was regarded as a kinship group enjoyed
recognition by the state, which provided an incentive even for non-kin
entities to present themselves as if they were founded on relations of kinship.37

36. For a longer discussion of these characterizations, see Ruskola, supra note 16, at 1613–16.
37. The account in the remainder of this section draws on a more extended argument in id. at
1619–59, and RUSKOLA, supra note 17, at 60–107. It bears noting that by no means am I suggesting
that all Chinese enterprises were organized as “clan corporations”—only that they constituted an
ideologically privileged form with maximal legitimacy and legal recognition. Other corporate forms
of enterprise that engaged in various types of business and productive activities included guilds,
monasteries, and merchant networks of many kinds. See Ruskola, supra note 16, at 1633–34 n.116.
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Briefly, in what sense was kinship in clan corporations fictive?
Chinese kinship idioms are encompassing and often used metaphorically
in everyday discourse to refer to non-kin so as to recognize and foster
relations of intimacy and trust. Yet many late imperial clan corporations
stretched kinship terms far beyond ordinary usage. The pre-eminent example of fictions of corporate kinship was the legal “merger” of two or
more clans. As there are only about four hundred Chinese family names,
it was not uncommon for unrelated families in the same locale to have
the same name. If such families wished to pool their capital to set up a
new business, they would combine their genealogies by fabricating a
long-dead ancestor to whom they would begin offering sacrifices. Subsequently, the “new” clan would draw up a detailed contract to establish
how to operate the joint enterprise. In addition to instructions for carrying out sacrificial duties in the name of the clan’s ancestors, these contracts often contained specifications on how to manage the assets of the
ancestral trust, provisions on how to select full-time managers and what
their duties were, how to keep books and select auditors, and so forth.
Essentially, the contracts functioned as corporate bylaws in the form of
trust instructions. In fact, often the parties would take the contract to the
local magistrate who would in turn stamp and agree to enforce its provisions, thus giving the rules the express force of law.
Adoption was another way of adjusting kinship relations contractually. There are cases of a single clan adopting as many as three hundred
members. In effect poor families that could not afford to hold on to their
human capital ended up selling it to wealthy clan corporations. The economic aspect of these transactions is evident. Adoption contracts specified the price paid, while the sellers guaranteed title (by representing that
the adoptee had not been kidnapped or obtained in some other illegal
manner) and assured that if something should “happen” to the adoptee
subsequently it would be no longer of concern to the sellers. Likewise,
wives and concubines were in many ways bought and sold in the market
for productive as well as reproductive labor, as marriage too entailed a
written contract specifying the economic terms of the transaction, including bride price.
The utility of organizing economic entities in the form of Confucian
kinship was not limited to securing recognition from the state. As a consequence of being legally clothed in the “natural personality” of the
family, clan corporations were governed in effect by family law, which
in turn supplied a model of enterprise governance in which ownership
was separated from management. That is, under the norms of Confucian
kinship, while all the property of a family business is owned by the kinship group as a whole, its management is the province of its senior mem-
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bers. At the same time—again, at least in Confucian theory—in their
roles as managers the senior kin owe duties of loyalty and care to those
below them. Conceptually, Confucian family law thus mirrors the structure of modern American corporation law: managers have the authority
to run the corporation, subject to a fiduciary obligation to do so in the
interests of the corporation as a whole.
In short, insofar as the family was the preferred Confucian theory of
the firm—and indeed the theory of everything—even non-kin entities
engaged in the pursuit of profit routinely resorted to fictions of kinship in
order to make themselves legally cognizable and politically legitimate.
C. Socialism: Political Theories of the Firm
The orthodox socialist view has no less difficulty than the American liberal one in coming up with a coherent theory of the firm, but for
the opposite reason. The conceptual quandary of the theory of a socialist
firm does not arise from extreme individualism but rather from its opposite, extreme collectivism. In the end, neither assumption leaves room for
a firm with an integrity of its own. The assumption of collectivism seems
at first glance more hospitable to corporations, which are after all collective entities. Yet the problem arises from the fact that in the socialist vision there is ultimately only one legitimate collective entity: “the people.” Upholding the interests of the people is the highest and ultimately
sole arbiter of legitimacy. Hence, there is little room for political entities
mediating the relationship between the people and the Party-state.
As already noted, the orthodox socialist vision wishes to abolish
even the family, although that goal has turned out difficult to achieve in
practice. The economic sphere can hardly be abolished, but it too must be
organized so as to promote the interests of the people as a whole. Therefore, the only completely unimpeachable form of socialist enterprise is
the state-owned enterprise (SOE)—or more precisely, the “industrial enterprise owned by the whole people,” as the ownership form of state enterprises is defined legally in the PRC, in a careful attempt to elide the
troublesome distinction between “the people” and the “state.”38
Importantly, however, in a planned economy even an SOE has little
organizational integrity, or what a corporate lawyer would call legal personality. Ultimately, an SOE is simply one administrative unit in the
larger national economy—a glorified accounting convention in the calculus of the larger collective benefit. Even the biggest SOE is only a small
38. Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People Law (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 13, 1988, effective Aug. 1, 1988) (China).
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piece of the mother company, as the socialist theory of enterprise organization ultimately has room for only one enterprise—“People, Inc.,” as it
were, stated in the parlance of capitalism.
IV. ECONOMIC THEORIES, LEGAL FICTIONS
What should we make of our comparative examination of divergent
ways of conceptualizing economic enterprise, and of the different kinds
of problems they pose to the internal coherence of the larger normative
systems of which they form a part? For one thing it seems evident that in
order to attain ideological purity, the liberal, Confucian, and socialist
theories we have considered all resort to fictions—whether ideological
fictions of corporate personhood, fabricated kinship, or aspirational unity
in a socialist ideal of “the people.”
The liberal aspiration to maintain the integrity of political, economic, and intimate spheres is difficult, if not impossible, to enact, as life
does not yield to ideology. Instead of attempting to explain the existence
of relations of authority and trust in corporations in economic terms, it
might better to analyze them simply in the alternative modalities of politics and psychology. 39 The state is in fact necessarily and intimately involved in creating and maintaining the market.40 At the same time, even
if authority—in the form of a monopoly on organized violence—is what
distinguishes the state from other social institutions, it is of great ideological significance that we nevertheless justify even the state’s existence on
the basis of a reciprocity founded on contract, through the metaphoric
projection of a “social contract.” Yet no social contract is sustainable if
supported by nothing other than individuals’ self-interest in avoiding a
short, nasty, and brutish life. At least a modicum of trust is required as
well. Historically, the sphere of the family is no less plural in its constitution. As even—or especially—a child knows, the family is not simply a
haven of unmodified trust but also a structure of authority, with parents
exercising control over minor children (what John Locke characterized

39. In fact, many scholars are doing just this. For a political analysis, see, e.g., MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
(Princeton Univ. Press 1994); David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory
of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013); John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model
of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1993). The entire field
of behavioral economics similarly seeks to incorporate insights of psychology into economic analysis.
40. This insight is at least as old as Legal Realism. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
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as “paternal jurisdiction”).41 Equally significantly, feminist theorists have
challenged the very distinction between the political and the personal.
The state is no less involved in regulating the family than it is in maintaining the market.42 Finally, the intimate sphere is always also an endless ground of negotiation—a place where bargains are struck and deals
are entered into.43
If the liberal state’s difficulty is in maintaining a separation among
the logics of authority, contract, and trust, a Confucian commonwealth’s
problem is the impossibility of making life conform to a single one of
trust. It will not come as a surprise that the Chinese imperial state and the
Confucian family unit relied as much on authority as on the (theoretically) self-enforcing fiduciary logic of trust. At the same time, as we have
seen, even a seemingly upright clan corporation was as likely to be a
“nexus of contracts”—a voluntary contractual undertaking—as a “natural” unit integrated by fiduciary norms of kinship.
Life is no less hospitable for socialist theory. The work unit of a
large Chinese SOE is possibly the closest thing to the actual realization
of state socialism. More than merely a place to work, historically it has
been an extraordinary cradle-to-grave system of welfare, with lifetime
job security, housing, childcare, schools, hospitals, and retirement benefits. In other words, it has been simultaneously an arm of the state, an
economic unit, and a family writ large. Even under socialism it is not
possible for a single-state based logic simply to displace competing economic and familial ones.44
One important conclusion is that what we typically refer to as the
theory of the firm in our economic and legal analyses would be better
called a liberal theory—not a universal one. This is not to discredit the
theory, but only to take note of the assumptions it makes. Our economic
theories of enterprise surely have considerable explanatory power with
41. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 7, 38–39 (1986). To be sure,
while Locke used political analogies to analyze familial relations, by no means did he mean to suggest that patriarchal and political authority were identical. GORDON J. SCHOCHET, PATRIARCHALISM
IN POLITICAL THOUGHT : THE AUTHORITARIAN FAMILY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES ESPECIALLY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 245 (1988).
42. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).
43. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (Harvard Univ. Press 1981).
For an application of transaction cost economics to the househould—a central institution of the
intimate sphere that is not necessarily limited to family—see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE
HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008). For an analysis of the corporatization of residential communities, see NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, Corporate Culture and Community at
Home, in MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 112 (1998).
44 . See generally ANDREW WALDER, COMMUNIST NEO-TRADITIONALISM: WORK AND
AUTHORITY IN CHINESE INDUSTRY (1988).
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regard to U.S. corporations and the U.S. legal and political systems.
However, when we turn to analyzing other legal systems embedded in
different political and moral economies, it is vital to be aware of those
assumptions, for they are as likely to obstruct our analysis as to aid it.
As an heir to Legal Realism, Law and Economics has helped us denaturalize the corporation as a legal entity. This view stands in contrast
to the views of late nineteenth-century “real entity” theorists for whom
the corporation was effectively a kind of super-person, a metaphysically
real entity in its own right, the existence of which preceded law whose
main task was merely to declare its social existence. 45 Economists have
helped to demystify the debate by bringing it down to the level of ordinary mortals. For all our sophistication in regarding corporate personality
as a legal fiction, all too often even corporate lawyers reify corporations,
speaking of them as if they were indeed individual actors with subjective
purposes. Whatever its conceptual difficulties, even a nexus-of-contracts
analysis denaturalizes the corporation as an entity and reminds us that a
corporation itself can do nothing: it can only act through its agents. Ultimately only people can sign contracts, commit crimes, or fire other people.
It is thus a signal virtue of economic analysis that it breaks down
the corporation—and other forms of economic enterprise—as a singular
entity. However, in this breakdown individual persons become the legal
equivalents of the smallest subatomic particle in physics: they are the
legal fundaments of the system, basic units that cannot be broken down
any further. Although the Romantic attachment to metaphysically real
corporations has passed into history, our analyses remain dedicated to the
category of “person,” an ideological premise of liberal individualism.
That is, we continue maintain a commitment to the Enlightenment idea
of the individual as a coherent, self-identical subject of free will, even as
that subject has been taken to task philosophically, psychologically, and
politically over the course of the twentieth century.46
While this may still be a relatively unproblematic assumption for
liberal capitalism, it is emphatically not one shared either by Confucian
or socialist worldviews for which the “real” subjects are the kinship
group and “the people,” respectively. Just as economists’ rigorous indi45. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ‘Real Entity’ Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 576 (1989).
46. The challengers range from psychoanalysis to post-structuralism to analytic philosophy.
See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (Joan Riviere trans.,
Wash. Square Press 1968) (1924); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: THE ARCHAEOLOGY
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1970); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
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vidualism tends to naturalize the individual actor as an ontological category—rather than a mere methodological postulate—so lawyers too inhabit a world where (in civil law terminology) there exist only “persons,”
“things,” and “actions.” The lawyer’s “persons” in turn are divisible into
“legal persons” and “natural persons,” the latter being seemingly a natural category equivalent to the economist’s “individuals.” Yet law can
never simply describe a pre-legal or pre-political reality. It cannot look
beyond itself to nature, as there are no more “natural” persons than there
are “unnatural” ones. Although legal theorists assert that the “only natural persons are human beings,” even the lawyer’s “natural” person is ultimately a legal classification. 47 As Hans Kelsen noted, “even the socalled physical person is an artificial construction of jurisprudence” and
hence “actually only a ‘juristic’ person.” 48
This is not to deny that we are born with bodies that can be demarcated physically from the environment in which we find ourselves. Yet
while it seems evident that our bodies mark the boundaries of our “natural” selves, it is far from clear what the existential or political significance of this fact is. From the point of view of liberalism—growing out
of a Cartesian opposition of self to world, and subject to object—our
bodies are indeed what separate us from the world and from other human
beings. Yet in a Confucian view our bodies are what connect us to others, and to the world around us. Rather than the one thing that we “possess” without qualification, our bodies are not even ours, but belong to
those who preceded us and gave birth to us (given that to date no human
being has given birth to himself). We are all part of a larger body, connecting the dead, the living, and the unborn in a single intergenerational
entity.49 In a socialist understanding in turn the foundational category of
analysis is the political collective, workers united by bonds of class.
Considered from this broader angle, we might say that economic analyses typically replace one large fiction with a smaller one—corporate
legal personality with that of liberal individualism. Whether our “true”
nature as human beings is our individuality or our connectedness to other
human beings is a vital existential question that is contested even in the
North Atlantic world, let alone across wider cultural divides, and it
seems unlikely to admit of a final answer.
47. David P. Derham, Theories of Legal Personality, in LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL
PLURALISM 1, 9 (Leicester C. Webb ed., Melbourne Univ. Press 1958) (Austl.).
48. HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 172 (Max Knight trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1970)
(1967).
49. For a comparison of liberal and Confucian views of the embodied human subject, see David L. Eng, Teemu Ruskola & Shuang Shen, Introduction: China and the Human, 29 SOCIAL TEXT,
Winter 2012, at 1.
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When Bayless Manning surveyed the field of corporation law some
forty years ago he observed ruefully that the “rules, the vocabulary, the
inherited symbols are all awry.” In response, he urged us to get beyond
“poetic” metaphors. 50 Alas, we have no choice but to think in terms of
metaphors. Some may be more apposite than others, but none are simply
right or wrong, true or false. The idea of “corporation” has no transhistorical meaning, nor is there a single correct way to analyze economic
enterprise. Indeed, so elastic are our concepts that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means regarded the public ownership of modern corporations as a
way of socializing property and thus a move toward a more communist
form of ownership in the United States. 51 In his ethnography of Trobriand Islanders in Melanesia, the legal anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski likens even a group of fishermen operating a canoe to a “joint-stock
company”—a poetic metaphor indeed.52
Whether economic enterprises are best thought of as voluntary associations of private individuals, as akin to the family, or as amenable to
the logic of the state are immensely important questions. And so are the
corollary questions of the extent to which the family is a public institution and thus properly subject to state authority, and the degree to which
the state itself is best thought of in terms of elective kinship and affective
belonging—or alternatively as only a giant calculator that aggregates our
individual preferences through electoral democracy. 53
50. Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and
Particular Reservations, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 38, 51 (1960).
51. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 34. This view of the role of corporations was anticipated by
Karl Marx himself. III KARL MARX, CAPITAL (1984); see also WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING
CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997).
52. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 19–20 (Hartcourt,
Brace & Co. 1926) (1984). Similarly, when examined by an economist or economic historian, a host
of institutions can be analyzed as “firms.” See, e..g, ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. ET AL., SACRED
TRUST: THE MEDIEAVAL CHURCH AS AN ECONOMIC FIRM (1996).
53. Indeed, the boundaries between the market and the state, on the one hand, and the market
and the family, on the other, seem to be becoming more and more porous in the United States. Suggesting a transition from liberalism to neo-liberalism, political power is increasingly commodified
under legalized bribery known as “campaign finance,” while numerous traditionally domestic functions are being outsourced to the market, from childcare, to cooking, to cleaning, and much else.
There is, it seems, an increasingly singular logic of contract that is beginning to challenge those of
authority and trust. If so, our future may look something like this:
POLITICAL
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At a minimum, though, the answers to these questions are not deducible from legal forms. The U.S. legal system tends to privilege bargains among autonomous individuals (legitimated in the idiom of contract) while both Confucianism and Chinese socialism prefer to rely on
trust among members of communities (legitimated in the idiom of the
family or the people). If we begin with the individual as the foundational
unit, private economic activity appears as natural while political institutions need to be explained and justified (say, in terms of “social contract”). In contrast, if one begins with the opposite assumption, treating
the collective as the basic unit, the question becomes why and when
should individual actors be allowed to control large concentrations of
economic resources without moral supervision and political checks—a
question of considerable concern both to the late imperial Chinese state
and the PRC.
Whether we use the template of the individual in social, economic,
and political organization or prefer the model of the family, or the state,
it is vital to recognize that our choices reflect ultimately our ideological
predilections. Whichever model we choose, we must not confuse that
choice with an ontological discovery.
V. WHAT IS “ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY”?
The need to recognize enterprise organization as part of a larger political economy is not of purely theoretical importance but has considerable implications for our analysis of, and prescriptions for, the organization of business enterprise in China today. As the PRC first embarked on
enterprise reforms in the 1980s, among its primary goals was to create
“enterprise autonomy.” While providing for non-state ownership was out
of the question, the state wished to establish a space of significant autonomy for SOE managers. Remarkably, what was being prescribed as the
solution to the problems of Chinese SOEs was precisely what constitutes
the chief problem of U.S. corporation law—a division of labor between
owners and managers, with the resultant agency problem that corporation
law seeks to overcome.54
One might view this as a manifestation of a precisely backward understanding of (Western) corporation law. More innocently but no less
damningly, it could also be regarded as a case of mindless imitation of,
and fascination with, things Western (“if American corporations have

54. See Donald C. Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517, 545
(1994); William H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese “Socialist Market” Enterprise, 21 J.
CORP. L. 267, 287 (1996).
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this problem, we should too”). However, viewed from the broader perspective suggested above, it is evident that separating ownership from
management is a genuine answer, or at least an attempt at one, to real
problems that are distinctive to Chinese enterprises. 55
Let us consider in some detail the agency problems of a classic
Chinese SOE and its relationship to the state. 56 If we begin with the latter, we should note that the Chinese Party-state itself bears a striking resemblance to a corporation, at least if we regard the separation between
ownership and management as a key criterion. In principle, SOEs are
only administrative sub-units of the state, as we have seen. Ultimately it
is the people who own all the public assets, including those of SOEs,
while the state has an obligation to manage those assets in the people’s
collective interest. The main structural problem of this arrangement is the
lack of an institutional mechanism to enforce the state’s fiduciary obligation.
We might analyze this system also in terms of historical continuities in the organization of state power in China. The Party-state’s relationship to “the people” is not unlike that between the emperor and his
subjects. Both regimes owe a fiduciary-like obligation to those they govern, and both regimes resolve the resulting agency problem in a similar
fashion: by insisting on the psychological and political unity of the ruler
and the ruled so that the interests of the two are no longer separate. In a
Confucian state, the family metaphor turns the agency problem into no
problem at all, as the emperor is to be trusted like a father. In socialist
ideology, it is the Party-state’s Leninist claim to stand in for the people
that denies the existence of a potential cleavage between the interests of
the state as an agent and the people as its principals. Yet the Party-state’s
fiduciary duty is as difficult to enforce as fiduciary relationships in the
family. When the state fails to promote the interests of the people, there
is indeed no mechanism of control, such as voting the power holders out
of office, as in the case of electoral (and corporate) democracy.
Nevertheless, while it may be politically correct to view the people
themselves as the owners of SOEs, it is economically more realistic to
55. In fact, several participants in the reorganization of SOEs have been well versed in Western
theoretical analyses of enterprise organization. See, e.g., QIN XIAO, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND
CHINESE ENTERPRISE REFORM: THE CASE OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION (2004).
56. That is, the following discussion pertains to “true” pre-reform SOEs, in contrast to their
“corporatized” contemporary counterparts, or SOEs that have been formally converted to the legal
form of the corporation under the PRC Company Law. Colloquially, such enterprises are still often
called SOEs, even though they are no longer “state-owned” but rather “state-controlled,” with the
state as the controlling shareholder.

664

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:639

view the state as the true owner, as it is the residual claimant in SOEs.
Insofar as SOEs are thus owned and managed by the state, they would
seem to suffer from no agency problem—surely the state is capable of
monitoring and controlling its own behavior. It would thus seem more
appropriate to liken SOEs not to corporations but to sole proprietorships,
with the state exercising full ownership over each one.
Yet the sole proprietorship analogy too is imperfect. The Chinese
state is not a singular entity in a meaningful sense but consists of numerous overlapping bureaucracies and supervisory agencies competing for
control over public enterprises. Historically, managers of Chinese SOEs
have therefore been subject to the direct or indirect control of multiple
principals, each seeking to use the enterprises under its supervision to the
advantage of its own political and administrative constituencies. The resulting problem has hardly been lack of control by principals, but an excess of inconsistent and contradictory attempts at control by numerous
supervisory organs of the state. The historic dilemma of Chinese SOEs is
thus not that the principals cannot control the managers, but that they
have too much control. The solution to this particular dilemma has been
to create a greater degree of separation of ownership and control, so as to
provide for managerial autonomy.
At the same time, distancing the state from SOEs is not simply a
managerial imperative. In addition to being the residual claimant in
SOEs, the state is also the residual deep-pocket. Historically, before the
relatively recent transformation of socialist SOEs into corporations under
the PRC Company Law (enacted in 1993 and revised in 2005), when
SOEs’ operational expenses exceeded their receipts, the state was responsible for making up the difference. 57 Thus, when the Chinese government as well as Chinese commentators first began to emphasize the
importance of “enterprise autonomy” in the 1980s, the term was shorthand for the need to create enterprises with independent legal personality—that is, corporate entities with limited liability, thereby releasing the
state from its obligations to cover the losses of the state sector. In the
absence of a legitimate (socialist) theory of the firm, the notion of “enterprise autonomy” came in effect to stand in for the main structural and
operational characteristics of Western-style business corporation, includ-

57. See Company Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993,
effective July 1, 1994; revised by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective
Jan. 2006) (China).
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ing both centralized management (desired by SOE managers) and limited
liability (desired by the state).58
When we are analyzing phenomena in different political economies
operating under different political and ideological constraints, it is indeed
possible that the “problem” of one system may be a “solution” in the
other.
VI. CONCLUSION
Putting aside both state socialism and Confucianism, it is a striking
fact that even in the United States “no consensus exist[s] in the legal
community as to why corporate law imposes fiduciary duties or what the
operative ‘principles’ of corporate fiduciary law ought to be.”59 If nothing else, this dissensus reflects the ultimate indeterminacy of the legal
form of the corporation. It is just that—a legal form. To give it substantive content we must have a theory of what a corporation is, or ought to
be. The multiplicity of our theories of how best to understand, and organize, business enterprises is in the end a symptom of larger differences
about the social and political purposes corporations ought to serve. Legal
analysis alone cannot tell us what those purposes ought to be—despite
Manning’s heartfelt desire to get our conceptual vocabulary of corporation law “right.”
By no means is the desire for definitive analytic categories limited
to economic theorists. No lesser an authority than the legal anthropologist Paul Bohannan predicted in 1969 that “within a decade or two”
comparative lawyers would come up with a methodology that would allow us to describe legal systems—foreign and domestic—in “a whole
new independent language without national home,” something akin to
“Fortran or some other computer language.” 60 That prediction has evidently not come to pass. To the extent that our theories of the firm are
ultimately liberal theories of the firm, they run the risk being limited to
“the wisdom of the native bourgeois categories” of the West, effectively
“flourishing as ideology at home and ethnocentrism abroad,” in the cautionary words of another anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins. 61
58. See Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People Law, supra note 38, at art. 2
(providing that SOEs shall be responsible for their own losses as well as their profits, have independent legal personality, and be managed in accordance with the “principle of the separation of
ownership and managerial authority”).
59. William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1084, 1084 (1993) (emphasis added).
60. Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAURA NADER,
LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401, 415 (1969).
61. MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS xii–xiv (Aldine Publ’g Co. 1972).
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To apply liberal economic analysis without modification to nonliberal legal and political orders risks assuming precisely what we cannot
know in advance. If we take for granted which phenomena are best analyzed as economic rather than political ones, for example, we will fail to
attend to what should be one of the main objects of our analysis—
ascertaining precisely where the boundary between the economic and
political lies in the system under examination. A fusion of political and
economic power may be just that: a deliberate fusion, not a confusion.62
The state–market–family distinction represents nothing more (or less)
than the ideological premises of liberal capitalism, not a transcendental
truth. As institutional economists know all too well, even less than optimal institutions can persist over time for reasons of inertia—a phenomenon they characterize as path-dependency.63 Importantly, it is not only
institutions of the material kind that can become path-dependent. Theory
too can become invested in certain categories, even after they have been
depleted of their explanatory power.
The ultimate “agency problem,” in economic enterprise as in life, is
who gets what? Who counts as a principal? To understand fully the ways
in which our economic, social, and political relations are organized in the
modern business corporation, at a minimum we need the insights of psychology and political theory as well as those of economics. At the same
time, we must keep in mind that the questions posed by corporation law
have no final answers. There is no end of history for corporation law, any
more than for history itself.64 Where should we draw the boundary between the inside and the outside of a corporation? Today, the insiders
include shareholders and managers, which is why the law of corporate
governance focuses on the dilemmas of ownership and control. But in a
model of the corporation based as much on membership as ownership,
might we not include workers too as insiders? Or even the public atlarge? Perhaps even the environment?
In defining these limits, corporation law is part of a larger narrative
about personhood—telling us who we are and what we owe one another,
and indeed who “we” are, or would wish to be.

62. See, e.g., SONJA OPPER, ZWISCHEN POLITICAL GOVERNANCE UND CORPORATE GOVERNEINE INSTITUTIONELLE ANALYSE CHINESISCHER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN (Baden Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004) (Ger.).
63. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
64. But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
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